Abstract. The Connes Embedding Problem (CEP) asks whether every separable II1 factor embeds into an ultrapower of the hyperfinite II1 factor. We show that the CEP is equivalent to the computability of the universal theory of every type II1 von Neumann algebra. We also derive some further computability-theoretic consequences of the CEP.
Introduction
Let R denote the hyperfinite II 1 factor. In his seminal paper [4] , Connes proved that L(F n ), the group von Neumann algebra of the free group of rank n, embeds into an ultrapower R U of R. He then casually remarked that "Apparently such an imbedding ought to exist for all (separable) II 1 factors..." This seemingly innocuous statement is now referred to as the Connes Embedding Problem (hereafter referred to as the CEP) and is arguably the most important open problem in the theory of II 1 factors. Due to the work of Kirchberg and others, there are now many equivalent formulations of the CEP spanning nearly all parts of operator algebras as well as various areas outside of operator algebras such as geometric group theory and noncommutative real algebraic geometry; see [3] for a survey on the many equivalents of CEP.
In the article [6] , it is shown how to view tracial von Neumann algebras as structures in a particular continuous logic suited for studying structures from analysis. Moreover, is shown how the classes of tracial von Neumann algebras and II 1 factors form axiomatizable classes in this logic. In the sequel [7] , the authors observe that CEP is actually equivalent to the logical statement that every II 1 factor has the same universal theory as R. Roughly speaking, this means that, for any quantifer-free formula ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) (which is essentially just a continuous function applied to the traces of various * polynomials in the variables x 1 , . . . , x n ), where x 1 , . . . , x n range over the unit ball of a II 1 factor, we have sup{ϕ( a) : a ∈ R 1 } = sup{ϕ( b) : b ∈ M 1 } for any II 1 factor M . It is then immediate that this latter statement is equivalent to its existential version, obtained by replacing sup's by inf's, which is often called the Microstate Conjecture, a well-known equivalent to the CEP.
In this paper, we use the CEP to show that the universal theory of R is computable, meaning that there is an algorithm such that, given any quantifier-free formula ϕ( x) and any dyadic rational ǫ > 0 as input, returns an interval I ⊆ R (with dyadic rational endpoints) of length at most ǫ such that sup{ϕ( a) : a ∈ R 1 } ∈ I. (Of course, such an algorithm will then also exist for existential sentences.)
Trivially, the result of the previous paragraph shows that, assuming CEP, every type II 1 von Neumann algebra has a computable universal theory (as its universal theory coincides with the universal theory of R). What if instead one started with the assumption that every type II 1 von Neumann algebra has a computable universal theory? Consider the algorithm that starts comparing the values of universal sentences in R with other II 1 factors; if CEP failed, this algorithm would eventually tell us so, otherwise, the algorithm would run forever. Thus, the assumption that every type II 1 von Neumann algebra has a computable universal theory would only help one verify that CEP failed (if CEP were in fact false). Unfortunately, this line of thought is doomed to fail. Indeed, we prove that, if every type II 1 von Neumann algebra has a computable universal theory, then the CEP holds. The key point here is to show that if the CEP fails, then it "fails very badly" in the sense that if there are at least two distinct universal theories of type II 1 algebras, then there are continuum many such universal theories.
In the last section, we derive further computability-theoretic consequences of the CEP.
A curious byproduct of our results is that both sides of the CEP vs. NCEP (not CEP) debate will find something useful here to consider in their endeavors. Indeed, if one is trying to prove that CEP is true, then it seems a priori easier to show that all universal theories of type II 1 algebras are decidable rather than equal. And if one is trying to prove NCEP, then the strong computability-theoretic consequences derived from CEP should be seen as strong evidence that the CEP is far too strong to be true.
We would like to thank David Sherman for a helpful conversation regarding this project.
Prerequisites from Logic
In this paper, by a tracial von Neumann algebra we mean a pair (A, tr), where A is a von Neumann algebra and tr is a faithful, normal trace on A. However, we often suppress mention of the trace and simply say "Let A be a tracial von Neumann algebra..." (This causes no confusion when A is a II 1 factor for then the trace on A is unique.) For a von Neumann algebra A, we let A 1 denote the operator norm unit ball.
Let F denote the set of all * -polynomials p(x 1 , . . . , x n ) (n ≥ 0) such that, for any von Neumann algebra A, we have p(A n 1 ) ⊆ A 1 . For example, the following functions belong to F:
• the "constant symbols" 0 and 1 (thought of as 0-ary functions);
• (x, y) → xy;
• (x, y) → x+y 2 . We then work in the language L := F ∪ {tr R , tr ℑ , d}, where tr ℜ (resp. tr ℑ ) denote the real (resp. imaginary) parts of the trace and d denotes the metric on A 1 given by d(x, y) := x − y 2 . We can then formulate certain properties of tracial von Neumann algebras using the language L as follows.
Basic L-formulae will be formulae of the form tr
where f : R m → R is a continuous function and ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ m are basic Lformulae. Finally, an arbitrary L-formula is of the form
is a quantifier-free formula, and each Q i is either sup or inf; we think of these Q i 's as quantifiers over the unit ball of the algebra. If each Q i is sup (resp. inf), then we say that the formula is universal (resp. existential).
Remarks 2.1.
(1) Our setup here is a bit more special than the general treatment of continuous logic in [1] , but a dense set of the formulae in [1] are logically equivalent to formulae in the above form, so there is no loss of generality in our treatment here. (2) In order to keep the set of formulae "separable", when forming the set of quantifier-free formulae, we restrict ourselves to a countable dense subset of the set of all continuous functions R m → R as m ranges over N. In fact, one can take this countable dense set to be "finitely generated" which is important for our computability-theoretic considerations. (See [2] .)
Suppose that ϕ( x) is a formula, A is a tracial von Neumann algebra, and a ∈ A n 1 , where n is the length of the tuple x. We let ϕ( a) A denote the real number obtained by replacing the variables x with the tuple a; we may think of ϕ( a) A as the truth value of ϕ( x) in A when x is replaced by a. For example, if ϕ(x 1 ) is the formula sup x 2 d(x 1 x 2 , x 2 x 1 ), then ϕ(a) A = 0 if and only if a is in the center of A.
If ϕ( x) is a formula, then there is a bounded interval [m ϕ , M ϕ ] ⊆ R such that, for any tracial von Neumann algebra A and any a ∈ A, we have
If ϕ has no free variables (that is, all variables occurring in ϕ are bound by some quantifier), then we say that ϕ is a sentence and we observe that ϕ( a) A is the same as a ranges over all tuples of A of the appropriate length, whence we denote it simply by ϕ A . Given a tracial von Neumann algebra, the theory of A is the function Th(A) which maps the sentence ϕ to the real number ϕ A . (Sometimes authors define Th(A) to consists of the set of sentences ϕ for which ϕ A = 0; since Th(A), as we have defined it, is determined by its zeroset, these two formulations are equivalent.) If we restrict the function Th(A) to the set of all universal (resp. existential) sentences, the resulting function is defined to be the universal (resp. existential) theory of A, denoted Th ∀ (A) (resp. Th ∃ (A)). We should also mention that, as a consequence of Łos' theorem, we have Th(A) = Th(A U ) for any ultrafilter U .
Remark 2.2 (For the logicians).
In what follows, we will restrict ourselves to L-structures that are tracial von Neumann algebras. We can do this because it is shown that the class of (unit balls of) tracial von Neumann algebras forms a universally axiomatizable class of L-structures.
Let T be a set of L-sentences. We say that a tracial von Neumann algebra A models T , written A |= T , if ϕ A = 0 for each ϕ ∈ T . It is shown in [6] that there is a set T II 1 of L-sentences such that A |= T II 1 if and only if A is a II 1 factor. In fact, there is a recursive such set T II 1 , meaning that there is an algorithm which determines, upon input a sentence σ, whether or not σ belongs to T II 1 . The aforementioned observation will be crucial for what is to follow and so we isolate it: Fact 2.3. The class of II 1 factors is recursively axiomatizable.
Up until now, we have been treating tracial von Neumann algebras semantically. It will be crucial to also treat them syntactically. In [2] , a proof system for continuous logic is established. In our context, this gives meaning to the phrase "the axioms T II 1 can prove the sentence σ," which we denote
Fact 2.4. The set {σ : T II 1 ⊢ σ} is recursively enumerable, meaning that there is an algorithm that runs forever and continually returns those σ for which T II 1 ⊢ σ.
Proof. This follows immediately from the existence of the proof system developed in [2] together with Fact 2.3.
There is a connection between the semantic and syntactic treatments developed above (which [2] refers to as "Pavelka-style completeness"). Let − . : R 2 → R be the function x − . y := max(x − y, 0) and let D denote the set of dyadic rational numbers. 
We denote this common value by ϕ T II 1 . 
CEP implies Computability
In this section, we assume that CEP holds. For ease of notation, we set T := T II 1 .
Lemma 3.1. Suppose that σ is universal. Then σ T = σ R .
Proof. By definition, σ R ≤ σ T . Now fix a separable II 1 factor M ; we must show σ M ≤ σ R . This follows immediately from the fact that M is R ω embeddable.
Lemma 3.2. Suppose that σ is existential. Then σ T = σ R .
Proof. Again, it suffices to show that σ M ≤ σ R for arbitrary M |= T . But this follows from the fact that M contains a copy of R.
Proof. Observe that M σ − . σ is logically equivalent to an existential sentence. Using the previous two lemmas, we have
If A is a tracial von Neumann algebra, we say that Th ∀ (A) is computable if there is an algorithm such that, upon inputs universal sentence σ and positive dyadic rational number ǫ, returns an interval I ⊆ R of length at most ǫ with dyadic rational endpoints such that σ A ∈ I. One defines Th ∃ (A) being computable in an analogous way.
Remark 3.4. This is not the same notion of computable theory as defined in [2] but is more appropriate for our needs.
Corollary 3.5. Th ∀ (R) and Th ∃ (R) are computable.
Proof. Here is the algorithm: given universal σ and positive dyadic rational ǫ, run all proofs from T and wait until you see that T ⊢ σ − . r and T ⊢ (M σ − . σ) − . s where r − (M σ − s) ≤ ǫ. By the previous corollary, this algorithm will eventually halt and the interval [M σ − s, r] will be the desired interval.
Computability implies CEP
Recall that NCEP implies that there are at least two distinct universal (equivalently existential) theories of type II 1 algebras. In fact:
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that CEP fails. Then there are continuum many different universal (equivalently existential) theories of type II 1 algebras. In fact, there is a single existential sentence σ such that σ M takes on continuum many values as M ranges over all type II 1 algebras.
Proof. For N ∈ N, A a type II 1 algebra, a a tuple from M , and ǫ > 0, let σ N,A,a,ǫ be the existential sentence
Since CEP fails, there are N , A, a, and ǫ > 0 such that σ R N,A,a,ǫ > 0. (Of course σ A N,A,a,ǫ = 0.) For simplicity, set σ := σ N,A,a,ǫ and r := σ R . For each t ∈ [0, 1], set A t := tR ⊕ (1 − t)A, which denotes the direct sum of R and A with trace tr t := t tr R +(1 − t) tr A . Note that each A t is a type II 1 algebra and the map t → σ At : [0, 1] → R is continuous. Since σ A 0 = 0 and σ A 1 = r, the proof of the proposition is complete. Corollary 4.2. Suppose that the universal theory of every type II 1 algebra is computable. Then CEP holds.
Proof. Suppose that CEP fails. By the previous lemma, there are uncountably many universal theories of type II 1 algebras. But there are only countably many programs that could be computing universal theories of type II 1 algebras, whence not every type II 1 algebra has a computable universal theory.
Further computability-theoretic consequences of the CEP
In this section, we assume that CEP holds and we derive some further computability-theoretic results. Unlike Section 3, in this section, we let T denote the set of sentences whose models are the tracial von Neumann algebras (see Remark 2.2).
Fix a separable II 1 factor A with enumerated subset X = (a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , . . .) that generates A (as a von Neumann algebra). We now pass to a language L X containing L obtained by adding to L new constant symbols for each a i . We now add to T sentences of the form max(r n − . f ( a), f ( a) − . s n ), where f ∈ F and (r n , s n ) is a sequence of intervals of dyadic rationals containing f ( a) with s n − r n → 0; we call the resulting theory T (A,X) . (In model-theoretic lingo: we are just adding the atomic diagram of A to T .) Note that a model of T (A,X) is a tracial von Neumann algebra B whose interpretations of the new constants generate a von Neumann subalgebra of B isomorphic to A.
We say that (A, X) as above is recursively presented if there is an algorithm that enumerates each sequence of intervals (r n , s n ) for each f ∈ F. It is a standard construction in recursion theory to code a recursively presented tracial von Neumann algebra (A, X) by a single natural number, which we refer to as the Gödel code of (A, X).
Fix a recursively presented II 1 factor (A, X). Suppose that σ = sup x ϕ(x) is a universal sentence and ǫ is a positive dyadic rational. Then clearly there is n ∈ N such that σ A ≤ max i≤n ϕ(a i ) A + ǫ; we will say that such an n is good for (A, X, σ, ǫ). Consider the following algorithmic question: is there a way of computably determining some n that is good for (A, X, σ, ǫ)? The next result tells us that CEP implies that there is a single algorithm that works for all recursively presented (A, X) and all σ and ǫ. such that σ R ∈ I. By CEP, σ R = σ A . We claim that there is an N such that c −
2 ) ≤ ǫ, whence N is good for (A, X, σ, ǫ). Now we just start computing ϕ(a i ) A (which we can do since (A, X) is recursively presented) and wait until we reach N with c − ǫ 2 ≤ ϕ(a N ) A . Note that there is a countable X ⊆ R such that (R, X) is recursively presented. In the rest of this paper, we fix such an X and let T R := T (R,X) and let R X denote the obvious expansion of R to an L X -structure.
In the next proof, we will need the following fact (see [5, Lemma 3 .1]):
Fact 5.2. For any nonprincipal ultrafilter U on N, any embedding h : R → R U is elementary, that is, for any formula ϕ( x), and any tuple a ∈ R, we have ϕ R ( a) = ϕ R U (h( a)).
Lemma 5.3. Suppose that σ is a universal or existential L X -sentence. Then
Proof. As in Section 3, we need only show that σ M ≤ σ R X for every M |= T R . First suppose that σ is existential, say σ = inf x ϕ(c a , x), where a is a tuple from X and c a is the corresponding tuple of constants. Let i : R → M be the embedding of R into M determined by setting i(a) := c M a for every a ∈ X. Then
Now suppose that σ is universal, say σ = sup x ϕ(c a , x). Fix an embedding j : M → R U . Then
since ji : R → R U is elementary.
Corollary 5.4. Th ∀ (R X ) and Th ∃ (R X ) are computable.
Proof. This follows from the previous lemma just as in Section 3.
Define Th ∃∀ (R) to be the restriction of Th(R) to the set of formulae of the form Q 1
. . , x n ), where ϕ is quantifier-free, k ≤ n, and such that there is l ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that Q i = inf for i ∈ {1, . . . , l} and Q i = sup for i ∈ {l + 1, k}.
We say that Th ∃∀ (R) is upper computably enumerable if there is an algorithm that enumerates all sentences of the form σ − . s, where σ is an ∃∀-sentence and s is a dyadic rational with σ R < s. Proof. Consider (for simplicity) the sentence inf x sup y ϕ(x, y). For each a ∈ X and ǫ ∈ D >0 , use the previous corollary to find an interval I = [r, s] with dyadic endpoints of length ≤ ǫ such that sup y ϕ(a, y) R ∈ I. We then add the condition inf x sup y ϕ(a, y) ≤ s to our enumeration. We claim that this algorithm shows that Th ∃∀ (R) is upper computably enumerable. Indeed, suppose that inf x sup y ϕ(x, y) = s. Fix s ′ ∈ D, s < s ′ . Fix δ ∈ D >0 such that s + 2δ < s ′ . We claim that when the algorithm encounters a ∈ X such that sup y ϕ(a, y) R ≤ s + δ, our algorithm will let us know that inf x sup y ϕ(x, y) ≤ s ′ . Indeed, our algorithm will tell us that inf x sup y ϕ(x, y) ≤ d, where d ∈ D >0 and d ≤ sup y ϕ(a, y) R + δ.
